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Abstract—The rise of the social web has traditionally been ac-
companied by privacy concerns. Research on social web privacy
has been conducted from various directions including law, social
and computer sciences contributing to the body of literature. In
this paper, we argue for an interdisciplinary approach to capture
the multidimensional concept of privacy. For this purpose, we
propose a three-layered framework to systematically analyze
the privacy impact of various research directions. Subsequently,
we conduct an interdisciplinary literature analysis, highlighting
areas for improvement as well dependencies between different
research directions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, the evolution of the WWW led to a
significant growth of Online Social Networks (OSN) and is
receiving much attention in research. While Social Networks
have always been an important part of daily life, the advent of
Web 2.0 and its easy-to-use services increasingly shift social
life to their online counterparts. OSNs provide an infrastruc-
ture for communication, information and self-expression as
well as for building and maintaining relationships with other
users.
The rise of relevance and quantity of social web services
has been accompanied by privacy concerns. One the one hand,
these worries arise due to the prevalent oligopolistic social
web landscape with only few service providers possessing
large databases with millions of user profiles. On the other
hand, privacy concerns target the challenges of presenting
different facets of the self to different audiences and to
keep those views consistent. While this bears resemblance to
managing different appearances of the self in the real world,
the inherent properties of mediated OSN communication (e.g.
permanency and searchability of personal information) put
privacy at risk. Although privacy controls are in place to
currently restrict access to personal data, users seem to be
shortsighted concerning future issues of current behavior [45].
Both aforementioned areas of privacy have been intensively
tackled by research from various directions such as law, social
and computer sciences. Yet, the ambiguous nature of privacy
and multiple definitions available impede a consistent view
on the concept. Concerning this, Robert C. Post notes that
”[p]rivacy is a value so complex, so entangled in competing
and contradictory dimensions, so engorged with various and
distinct meanings, that I sometimes despair whether it can be
usefully addressed at all.”[37]
In this paper, we stress the need for integrating the insights
from diverse islands of research on social web privacy. We
contribute to this field by providing a framework to decompose
social web privacy and systematically analyze the impact
of different research directions. Subsequently, we apply the
framework to the body of research. Our results highlight areas
for improvement as well as dependencies between different
research directions emphasizing the necessity to foster inter-
disciplinary research on social web privacy.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In
the next Section, we give an overview of related work. In
Section III, we decompose social web privacy and transfer
its components into a framework for analyzing the concept
from different research directions. We apply our framework on
the existing body of research, differentiating between privacy
issues related to OSN users and to OSN service providers
in Section IV and Section V. Finally, in Section VI, we
summarize our findings and highlight areas for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
In this Section existing approaches that aim to integrate
several research directions to create a holistic view on privacy
are presented. Note that approaches for particular aspects of
privacy are discussed in our detailed impact analysis of the
various privacy perspectives in Section IV and Section V.
Spiekermann and Cranor provide a framework to build
privacy-friendly systems [42]. The authors distinguish between
privacy-by-policy and privacy-by-architecture. While the for-
mer is a legally-driven approach that focuses on notifying the
user and obtaining his consent prior to processing personal
data, the latter is a technically-driven approach to minimize
the collection of personal data without limiting functional-
ity. Their approach however does not consider the social
perspective of privacy and focuses on privacy in general
while this work is on social web privacy. The importance of
social web privacy is acknowledged by the European Union,
promoting several research projects. PADGETS aims at an
interdisciplinary approach to strengthen users’ privacy while
harnessing social network data for policy making. Similarly,
the European research project PrimeLife has developed a
framework to analyze privacy issues related to other OSN users
[39]. Project results show that privacy issues arise, when legal
or social norms are disregarded or technical safeguards are
Privacy issues related to
OSN Users OSN Service Providers
Legal International Standards (OECD Privacy Principles,
EU Data Protection Framework), National Laws
International Standards (OECD Privacy Principles,
EU Data Protection Framework), National Laws,
Privacy Policies
Technical Cryptography And Steganography, Privacy Agents,
Fine-grained Access Control Models, Visualization
Of Personal Data
Cryptography And Steganography, Privacy Agents
Social Peer-group Pressure, Trust Relationships, Tie
Strength, Privacy Awareness
Privacy Awareness, Pressure Of The Media
TABLE I
PROPOSED THREE-LAYERED FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING SOCIAL WEB PRIVACY
circumvented. Depending on the owner’s initial categorization
of personal data (private, semi-public, public), the presented
framework allows estimating potential privacy risks. Unlike
our approach, this work does not take privacy threats stem-
ming from OSN service providers into account, but solely
focuses on user-related privacy issues. PRESCIENT, another
EU funded project conducted an in-depth study of privacy
conceptualizations [25]. It takes a legal, social, economic and
ethical perspective on privacy, highlighting similarities and
interdependencies. This project results provide useful insights
to increase the general understanding of the concept of privacy,
however the analyses do not follow a structured approach as
shown in this paper.
III. PROPOSED THREE-LAYERED FRAMEWORK
In this Section, an overview of our proposed framework
is provided. The framework aims at providing a general-
purpose structuring of social web privacy research domains.
Subsequently, the concept of privacy is broken up into a set
of characteristics that are subsequently used to conduct our
impact analysis in Section IV and Section V.
A. Overview
In their conceptualization of privacy in the year 1890 as
”the right to be let alone”, Warren and Brandeis were one
of the first to recognize the multidimensionality of the privacy
concept [48]. Until then, privacy threats were primarily related
to a potential physical harm [40]. The rise of the information
age led to a large number of privacy conceptualizations from a
variety of directions such as social sciences, law, architecture,
urban design, health sciences, and computer and information
sciences. In their work to structure the concept of privacy, Patil
and Kobsa introduce three main perspectives to describe and
analyze privacy [35]:
Legal: Focuses on laws and policies aiming to protect the
individual from corporations, governments and other individ-
uals. For instance, the European Data Protection Framework
promotes informational self-determination emphasizing an in-
dividual’s rights to control the collection and use of personal
data [18].
Technical: Aims to translate norms and regulations into
technical specifications. The Platform for Privacy Preferences
Project (P3P) is an example for enhancing the individual’s
ability to control information disclosure by technical means
[13].
Social: Concentrates on managing social relationships
and the boundaries between private and public life. For in-
stance, Nissenbaum describes privacy as contextual integrity,
arguing that personal information is published within a well-
defined social context [33]. Privacy is breached if personal
information is available outside its intended context.
For this work, we adapt this three-layered view and extend
it to cover privacy risks of online social networks. Typically,
two distinct areas of research can be observed [49] [6]:
OSN Service Providers: Research in this direction in-
cludes means to legally bind service providers to comply
with current legislation, to increase end-user trust in service
providers and to provide technical safeguards, e.g. by crypto-
graphic or steganographic means [24].
OSN Users: Research aims to recreate the different social
contexts of the real world, e.g. by supporting an individual to
segment its social streams for specific audiences and providing
means to have different digital identities [47].
The two aforementioned research directions are combined
with the three perspectives on privacy (legal, technical, and
social) resulting in our proposed framework. The framework
is shown in Table I, with the cells containing concepts that
become relevant for the respective dimension. Note that the
three dimensions are not mutually exclusive but interdepen-
dent. Subsequently, in Section III-B the two research directions
(OSN Service Providers and OSN Users) are further decom-
posed into a set of privacy characteristics derived from liter-
ature review. These privacy characteristics are not exhaustive
but rather aim at providing a solid foundation for analyzing the
impact of the three perspectives on privacy. In the following,
these characteristics are described in detail.
B. Characteristics to analyze social web privacy
Data Sovereignty: Describes to what extend an individual
is able to control the processing of its personal data [4].
Personal data in OSN it typically available in a structured
manner and can easily be copied, linked, aggregated, and
transferred [39]. Consequently, it is difficult for an OSN user
to control the flow of personal information and thus putting
privacy at risk. The problem increases as OSN typically lack
the spatial, social, and temporal boundaries of the real world
which limit the flow of personal information by default [9].
Data Transience: Revolves around the loss of personal
information over time which can be considered typical char-
acteristic of real-world communication [39]. In contrast, the
mediated communication of OSNs results in a permanent
storage of personal information. Mayer-Scho¨nberger notes that
”[s]ince the beginning of time, for us humans, forgetting has
been the norm and remembering the exception. [..] Today, with
the help of widespread technology, forgetting has become the
exception, and remembering the default.” [31] In addition, this
permanency of personal information poses a great challenge
to privacy, since we are no longer free in constructing our
identities because contradictory information may be available
online [41].
Protection against profiling: Subsumes an individual’s
ability to prevent an adversary from collecting, aggregating
and linking personal data in order to create a digital dossier
[23]. Such profiling threats are increased if secondary data
such as location (e.g. stemming from mobile phones) and
connection logs are linked with existing OSN profiles [27].
The current landscape of social web service providers with
their targeted advertising-centered business models and large
identity silos additionally adds to this threat.
Audience Segregation: Originally developed by Goffman
[21], it states that each individual performs multiple and
possibly conflicting roles in everyday life, and it needs to
segregate the audiences for each role, in a way that people
from one audience cannot witness a role performance, that is
intended for another audience and thereby keep a consistent
self-image and maintain privacy [46]. In current OSNs, con-
tacts are typically classified as ”friends”, making it difficult
to selectively share personal information with a specific group
of people. As a result, privacy is threatened because a large
audience might have access to personal information.
Privacy Awareness: Encompasses attention, perception,
and cognition of which personal information others have
received and how this information is or may be processed [38].
An individual’s awareness for privacy risks is a prerequisite
for privacy-preserving behavior.
Transparency: With regards to OSN service providers,
transparency describes the user’s possibility to inform oneself
of processing and dissemination practices [10]. Taking a social
point of view, transparency implies an individual’s possibility
to recognize contextual boundaries, which is important to
contextual integrity [33].
Enforcement: Comprises an individual’s means to bring
his privacy preferences into force. With regard to OSN service
providers and OSN users, it describes the extent to which
an individual can control adherence to privacy settings and
limitations [11].
Table II provides a summary of the presented characteristics
of privacy. Most properties apply to privacy issues related to
Relevant for privacy issues related to
OSN Users OSN Service Providers
Data Sovereignty Yes Yes
Data Transience Yes Yes
Protection against profiling No Yes
Audience Segregation Yes No
Privacy Awareness Yes Yes
Transparency Yes Yes
Enforcement Yes Yes
TABLE II
PRIVACY CHARACTERISTICS OVERVIEW
social web users as well as to service providers, while audience
segregation only applies to the former and protection against
profiling only applies to the latter.
C. Classification scheme
For the classification, we facilitate a four-step ordinal scale
(none, minor, medium, and major impact) for rating the impact
of the previously defined dimensions (legal, technical and
social) in the next two Sections. No impact (none) indicates
that a certain dimension does not contribute to enhancing pri-
vacy. A minor impact implies that it only provides supportive
means, whereas a major impact expresses that it is a key driver
for strengthening privacy. A medium impact indicates that a
certain dimension has theoretical relevance for strengthening
privacy but practical limitations reducing their applicability.
Note that the application of an interval scale (quantitative) is
not feasible throughout such a qualitative analysis, which aims
at highlighting impacts of and dependencies between different
research directions.
In the following, the analysis of each privacy characteristic
is based on a structured scheme: At first, legal aspects are an-
alyzed highlighting their impact on both privacy issues related
to OSN users as well as OSN service providers. Secondly,
the impacts of existing technical approaches for enhancing
social web privacy are discussed. Finally, the implications of
social norms on strengthening privacy in the given scenario
are examined.
IV. PRIVACY ISSUES RELATED TO SOCIAL WEB USERS
In this Section we conduct an impact analysis of privacy
issues related to OSN users. The results are summarized in
Section IV-G.
A. Data Sovereignty
From a legal point of view, laws and policies applicable to
govern the exchange and flow of personal information between
people are typically not available. Thus the legal dimension
does not contribute to data sovereignty with regard to other
OSN users (no impact).
In addition to the legal dimension of data sovereignty,
several technical approaches have been proposed to support a
context-sensitive disclosure of personal data strengthening data
sovereignty. For instance, access control models that enable the
user to map their real world’s trust relationships to OSNs have
been introduced [12]. Such technical approaches in general
aim at recreating the real world’s social norms. Thus, they can
be considered a useful means to strengthen data sovereignty,
however, their overall impact is minor due to their limited
supportive character.
From a social point of view, data sovereignty is threatened
if personal information is taken out of its intended context.
Tagging people on pictures – a common feature of OSNs –
is a typical example of losing control of personal data flows.
Gross and Acquisti argue that social norms can strengthen
data sovereignty if the fine-grained social relations of the real
world can be transferred to OSNs as these foster reliability
and predictability of other user’s behavior [23]. However,
adherence to social norms highly depends on the trust rela-
tionship between two users, which are commonly divided in
weak ties and strong ties [17]. Strong ties typically reflect
relations with well-known acquaintances and an abuse of
confidence is likely to have an negative impact on their real-
world relationship [17]. In contrast, studies indicate that users
tend to have increasingly weak ties in OSNs, lacking fine-
grained social relations [8] [23]. Individuals are commonly
viewed as ”contacts” or even called ”friends”. Examining the
impact on privacy issues related to other OSN users, unautho-
rized disclosure can primarily be regarded a social problem
that relies on strong ties to be effective. As a consequence,
the overall impact of social aspects is medium, due to the
aforementioned prevalent weak ties of current OSNs.
B. Data Transience
Digitally mediated communication differs from real world
communication as the former adds persistence, searchability,
replicability, and scalability by default [9]. However, other
OSN users typically cannot be legally forced to delete volun-
tarily shared personal information after a given period of time.
As a consequence, there is no legal impact on data transience
regarding other users.
From a technical perspective, putting an expiry date on per-
sonal data is difficult as digital information that is eventually
available can easily be copied. While approaches to technical
data transience exist, successful attacks as demonstrated in
[19] substantiate their minor impact.
From a social point of view, the permanency of personal
information in OSNs poses major challenges. According to
Gross and Acquisti, OSN users are typically unaware of the
existing data storage periods [23]. Consequently, we deduce a
lack of social norms regarding data persistence and conclude
that there is no impact stemming from social aspects.
C. Audience Segregation
Managing the presentation of the self to different audiences
is a social challenge which is not governed by legal regulations
(no impact).
From a technical perspective, audience segregation is par-
tially implemented in common OSNs (e.g. Facebook Groups1
1http://www.facebook.com
and Google Circles2). In addition, audience segregation is
starting to gain attention in the research community. The
prototypical OSN Clique3, developed within the PrimeLife
project, for instance, implements a fine-grained access control
mechanism to present each audience with a different view
on a user’s identity [46]. Another approach presented in
[32] automatically determines distinct audiences based on the
user’s relationships. In the current state, a medium impact of
audience segregation on OSN user privacy can be deduced.
However, the increasing research activities indicate a future
growth of the importance of technical means.
Taking a social point of view, audience segregation is a
useful concept to apply the theory of contextual integrity as
outlined in Section III. Currently however, audience segrega-
tion is not well-supported in existing OSNs and thus users
resort to behavioral strategies such as choosing appropriate
communication channels (e.g. private messages) as well as
to mental strategies (e.g. self-censorship) [29]. Studies show
that managing different audiences is a burden to many users
and rarely applied [15]. Following the results of the afore-
mentioned studies, only a medium social impact of audience
segregation to privacy can be inferred.
D. Privacy Awareness
Awareness is an important requirement of social web pri-
vacy that affects many of the characteristics presented in
Section III. However, from a regulatory point of view, OSN
user awareness cannot be legally enforced (no impact).
Technical aspects such as usable user interfaces influence
the perceived privacy protection and the awareness of pri-
vacy risks [22]. However, similar to previous characteristics,
technical means only have a supportive character to facilitate
privacy awareness and point at potential privacy violations
(minor impact).
Privacy awareness is primarily a social concept with a gap
existing between theoretical and practical privacy awareness
[10]. This is backed by further studies indicating that OSN
users are frequently underestimating privacy risks and rarely
use available privacy settings [2] [23]. According to Acquisti,
immediate gratifications outweigh long-term privacy risk and
lead to a myopic evaluation of privacy risks [1]. In summary,
there is a medium social impact on the privacy protection from
other users due to the discrepancy between theoretical and
practical impact of privacy awareness.
E. Transparency
While bearing resemblance to privacy awareness, trans-
parency aims at enhancing the user’s understanding on the
propagation of his personal data within an OSN to better
protect this data from unauthorized access. From a legal
perspective, an individual has little means to force other users
to make their proliferation of others’ personal data transparent
as typically no respective regulations exist.
2https://plus.google.com
3http://clique.primelife.eu/
Data Sovereignty Data Transience Audience
Segregation
Privacy
Awareness
Transparency Enforcement
Legal
Technical
Social
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Taking a technical point of view, transparency-enhancing
approaches focusing on logging and retrospective analysis
of personal data disclosures have been proposed [28]. Ad-
ditionally, it has been shown that weak ties and loose shar-
ing preferences (e.g. friend-of-a-friend) may lead to a large
personal network and non-transparent personal data spread-
ing [23]. Technical approaches to visually improve personal
network transparency have been proposed, underlining that
transparency highly depends on the OSN service provider
and provided application programming interfaces (APIs) [44].
Following this argumentation, the technical impact has to be
regarded medium as many transparency mechanisms rely on
APIs to be provided by OSN service providers.
Similar to the legal dimension, the spreading of personal
information by other OSN users is typically not governed by
social norms, leading to no social impact on transparency.
F. Enforcement
From a legal point of view, enforcement of law is an
inherent property of any legal system. In the context of
social web privacy, an individual can seek for an injunction
if reputation-damaging information is published. However,
legal means are not universally applicable to the social web.
Following the European Court of Justice, legal protection
requires personal information to be restricted to close friends
and family members to be applicable [16]. In addition, legal
means only allow suing others after a privacy breach leading
to a minor overall impact of legal enforcement on the privacy
protection against other users.
Additionally, technical means may have a positive impact on
the enforcement of legal steps. However, current OSNs greatly
differ in providing technical means to move in on such aspects
(e.g. cyber-bulling) [7]. Thus, these means can be considered
to only have a supportive function with a minor impact.
Investigating privacy enforcement from a social perspective,
tie strength plays an important role. In some cases, a specific
group of an individual’s OSN (e.g. family members) may
have established social norms that allow each member to
employ peer-group pressure to enforce his privacy interests
[20]. Following the argumentation of [23] that relationships
in OSNs often consist of weak ties the social impact on the
enforcement of peer-pressure can be considered minor.
G. Summary
Table III summarizes the results of our impact analysis using
the proposed framework. This Section has underlined that pri-
vacy protection from other social web users is predominately
covered by social norms. This corresponds to the real world,
where users mainly rely on selective sharing of personal data
and highly differentiated relationships to ensure privacy. The
mediated nature of OSNs (e.g. permanent storage and search-
ability of personal data) adds a new layer of complexity. This
influences privacy as the informational environment of OSNs
is counterintuitive to the norms of personal data distribution
of the real world. This often leads to a violation of contextual
integrity [36]. Table III points out that technical approaches
to privacy can be seen as supportive means to translate social
norms to the OSNs with a potentially increasing importance in
the future. On the contrary, legal measures play a minor role
and are a last resort to retroactively punish privacy violations.
These observations corresponds to those of Strahilevitz, stating
that law does little to shape people’s actual expectations of
privacy [43].
V. PRIVACY ISSUES RELATED TO SERVICE PROVIDERS
Following the analysis of privacy issues related to social
web users, this Section investigates the impact of service
provider related privacy issues. Subsequently, the results are
summarized and integrated into our framework.
A. Data sovereignty
To ensure data sovereignty, legal norms have been en-
acted to control the exploitation of personal data by OSN
service providers [16]. For instance, according to the Ger-
man Teleservices Act and the Federal Data Protection Act,
service providers require the user’s explicit consent to use
personal data for advertising purposes [16]. Furthermore, legal
requirements for OSN service providers comprise the secure
storage of personal data and exclusion of search indexes by
default. Consequently, legal aspects have a high impact on
strengthening an individual’s data sovereignty.
From a technical point of view, several approaches to
facilitate data sovereignty have been proposed (e.g. [5], [24]).
These approaches rely on cryptographic and steganographic
means to effectively protect an individual’s personal data from
service provider access. Although they can easily be inte-
grated into current OSN, they commonly infringe the service
provider’s general terms and conditions as their business model
typically relies on free access to personal data for advertising
purposes [39]. Hence, despite the theoretical effectiveness of
the aforementioned approaches, the practical difficulties lead
to a only medium technical impact on data sovereignty.
Commonly, OSN users do not have any social relationship
with OSN service providers. As a consequence, an individual
cannot rely on social means to ensure the service provider’s
adherence to data sovereignty. Thus there is no impact stem-
ming from this dimension.
B. Data Transience
Similar to data sovereignty, data transience is well-covered
by legal norms and regulations to be fulfilled by OSN service
providers. Providers are required to entitle a user to delete
all personal data stored in a OSN profile and to cancel his
membership [16]. Similarly, the European Data Protection
Framework requires personal data to be removed, if the
purpose for which the data was collected ceases to exist [18].
This puts the user in a strong position and leads to a high legal
impact on data transience.
Approaches like [19] can be applied to technically enforce
data transience in respect to OSN service providers. However,
their impact in general can be considered as minor as most
of the OSN service providers prohibit any tools that put
access restrictions on personal data in their general terms and
conditions.
Similar to the previous argumentation dealing with data
sovereignty (see Section V-A), the missing social relationship
between OSN users and OSN service providers leads to no
social impact on enforcing data transience.
C. Protection against Profiling
Privacy threats stemming from OSN service providers have
been recognized by the OECD privacy principles [34] as
well as the EU Data Protection Framework [18]. Therein,
data minimization is one of the key principles to prevent
service providers from linking personal information and thus
from building digital dossiers. However, several of the social
web’s underlying principles counteract data minimization. For
instance, the business models of OSN service providers mostly
rely on personal data being used for advertising purposes. As
a consequence, several personal attributes are mandatory for
registration. Studies indicate that only 3 out of 29 OSNs allow
for a fully pseudonymous registration [7]. This leads to the
conclusion that, despite existing legal regulations to protect
the user against profiling, the legal impact in practice can be
considered as minor.
Technically, approaches presented in Section V-A can be
applied to prevent profiling. Other research directions include
the application of user-centric identity management systems
on OSNs to strengthen the user’s control and to prevent
service provider- and third party access without prior approval.
Maliki and Seigneur, for instance focus on the concept of
Identity 2.0 and respective implementations [30]. Concluding,
technical approaches in practice only have a minor impact
on the protection against profiling, as the general terms and
conditions of OSNs commonly prevent their application.
Again, due to the typically missing strong ties between OSN
users, social norms are not applicable for protecting against
profiling (no impact).
D. Privacy Awareness
Similar to user-related privacy threats (see Section IV-D),
awareness is primarily influenced from a social perspective,
while legal and technical means do not contribute at all.
Studies reveal that users of Facebook, for instance, put more
trust in the service provider than in average Facebook users
[2]. They further show that 56 percent believe that Facebook
does not share personal information with third parties and 70
percent believe that Facebook does not combine information
about them collected from other sources. Less than one out
of four users claims to have read Facebook’s privacy policy.
While privacy risks tend to remain invisible to the average
user [14], awareness raises, if privacy-invading features are
introduced such as Facebook’s News Feed [26]. Note that
a high awareness generally is seen as a major obstacle in
generating revenue by OSN service providers [49]. This leads
to the conclusion that while awareness increases in exceptional
situations, OSN users become accustomed to privacy threats
stemming from service providers and thus leading to a medium
social impact on privacy awareness.
E. Transparency
The primary source of information to assess the legal impact
on transparency is the service provider’s privacy policy. For
this purpose, Bonneau and Preibusch extensively analyzed the
privacy policies of 45 OSN providers [7]. As a result, flaws
in almost all privacy policies, ranging from bad technical
accessibility (e.g. by requiring JavaScript) to extensive use
of legal jargon which is far too difficult for ordinary users to
understand have been identified. Further issues include a miss-
ing specification of applicable national data protection laws
and the nation in which the data is stored and processed. The
results show that there is no significant correlation between a
network’s privacy score and actually privacy practices.
A similar study on service provider transparency reveals that
users are often unable to determine the amount of required
personal data prior to the registration [10]. It additionally
shows that even upon request by e-mail, service providers
often do not provide adequate support to increase transparency
of their data handling practices. Consequently, despite the
existence of privacy policies as valuable legal means to foster
transparency, there is only a medium legal impact due to the
aforementioned restrictions in their practical implementation.
Besides legal means, several technical approaches to service
provider transparency have been developed with P3P being a
prominent example [13]. P3P requires the service providers to
publish a machine-readable privacy policy that subsequently
can be matched with the user’s predefined privacy preferences.
Data Sovereignty Data Transience Protection ag.
Profiling
Privacy
Awareness
Transparency Enforcement
Legal
Technical
Social
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However, most OSN service providers do not provide a
machine-readable version of their privacy policy and thereby
making P3P inapplicable [7]. Additionally, the task of defining
privacy preferences can hardly be executed by non-technical
users [3]. Taking these shortcomings into account, there is only
a low impact of technical means to facilitate transparency.
Approaching transparency from a social perspective, media
coverage plays an important role in communicating personal
data handling practices of social web service providers [7].
Yet, they typically do not provide a profound analysis of
privacy problems but focus on partial aspects of privacy. The
minor impact of mass media on transparency is also backed by
the lack of privacy awareness (see Section V-D). This leads to
a minor overall impact of social means to foster transparency.
F. Enforcement
The inherent enforceability of legal measures (see Section
IV-F) also applies to OSN service providers and is also
reflected in the dominance of legal impact in the previous
Sections. OSN service providers typically employ a privacy-
by-policy approach (e.g. as defined in [42]), notifying and
obtaining the user’s consent to its privacy policy prior to
registration and thereby strengthening the legal impact to
enforce privacy interests (high impact).
Regarding the technical perspective, several means for en-
forcing OSN user’s privacy preferences are available (see
Section V-A and Section V-B). However, their overall practical
impact is minor, taking into consideration that these tools are
often prohibited by the service provider’s general terms and
conditions.
While social norms have a significant impact on enforcing
privacy interests towards other users (see Section IV-F) there
is typically no social relationship between a social web service
provider and its users. As a consequence, power structures of
social groups do not apply. In addition, the impact of mass
media coverage is a limited tool to put pressure on service
providers as already outlined in Section V-E. Thus, privacy
interests towards service providers cannot be socially enforced
(no impact).
G. Summary
Table IV sums up the results of our analysis of privacy is-
sues related to OSN service providers. Two major conclusions
can be derived: Firstly, a shift of impact from the social to
the legal dimension compared to Section IV can be seen. The
results secondly show an in general increased impact of all
dimensions compared to Section IV-G. Particularly the major
legal impact is noteworthy showing that legislators realize
the unequal distribution of power and consequently try to
strengthen the position of OSN users. In contrary, the minor
impact of social norms can be explained by the diffusion of
responsibility. As service providers are typically not embedded
in an individual’s social structure, social norms do not apply.
Similar to the results of Section IV-G, technical tools can be
seen as supportive means while their impact is often limited.
Finally, the limited means of all three dimensions to protect
an individual against profiling are noteworthy, emphasizing the
service providers’ efforts to protect their business model.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The rising popularity of online social networks poses many
challenges in the field of privacy. Unlike in the real world,
where personal information is ephemeral, in the online-world,
this information is almost infinitely available. This poses
great challenges for managing identities online and context-
sensitive sharing of personal information with other users.
In addition, the prevalent oligopolistic social web landscape
threatens privacy as it fosters the growth of identity silos.
We have argued for an interdisciplinary approach to tackle
the aforementioned privacy risks. Consequently, as the main
contribution of this paper, a framework to systematically
analyze social web privacy issues from a legal, technical and
social perspective has been proposed. Furthermore, the impact
of those three different perspectives on privacy among OSN
users themselves and between OSN users and service providers
has been highlighted based on a thorough literature review. The
results underline our initial assumption that the challenges of
social web privacy cannot be tackled from a single direction
but rather have to be addressed by a comprehensive interdis-
ciplinary approach.
This leads to a variety of research directions for future work.
For instance, the role of technology in pursuing social privacy
violations has to be investigated in detail. Additionally we aim
at overcoming the limitations of subjective qualitative char-
acterization of privacy impacts by conducting a quantitative
study investigating social web privacy based on the framework
presented in this paper. This could lead to further convergence
of research activities.
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